Another report, stupid commentary, a few fact sheets and more questions!
Perhaps everyone who does not understand how the National Energy Market works might want to read this AMEO fact sheet. (And I am pointedly looking at politicians, journalists, and talkback callers)
http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/1234_aemo2.pdf
AN INTRODUCTION TO AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET
I know this point has been made before but this quote is germane to understanding the context of all the other reports…
“AEMO’s highest priority as power system and market operator of the NEM is the management of power system security. Security of electricity supply is a measure of the power system’s capacity to continue operating within defined technical limits despite the disconnection of a major power system element, such as a generator or interconnector. The maintenance of power system security ensures the power system is operated in a way that does not overload or damage any part of it or risk overload or damage after a credible event.”
The media watch article that links to that fact sheet is here http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/s3596892.htm and contains and interesting quote from a 2012 report “…where has the brown coal electricity been going? Out of Victoria, to NSW and SA, where it has been displacing higher cost black coal generation in both States. — Pitt & Sherry Report, September, 2012” Now I’m not going to commit a Post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy and say that Pt Augusta shutting down was inevitable but there is a line of investigation there.
The updated AEMO report is here. https://www.aemo.com.au/Media-Centre/-/media/9027D5FB69294D408E4089249F38A36D.ashx
And some other info on the market is here. https://www.aemo.com.au/~/link.aspx?_id=C9A103FE3CD34BEDB8113744F28DB932&_z=z
My questions that still remain are
Why did the still as yet unnamed System Restart Ancillary Service (SRAS) generators fail? (there is some analysis provided but root causes are still unknown). If they had operated as they were being paid to do (they get fees to be on standby) would parts of the blackout been averted, and would the restoration time have been reduced? “SRAS are reserved for contingency situations in which there has been a major supply disruption or where the electrical system must be restarted.” (emphasis is mine)
How much of the generation tripping out was due to grid instability and how much due to sudden demand loss (due to population or industrial centres being disconnect from supply) . Who’s responsibility was it to specify the ” ‘voltage ride-through’ settings” the wind farms were using prior to connection to the NEM? Were the settings at the time within non-credible contingency? (I think the answer is yes to the last but some input who understands this stuff better than I do would be helpful)
How do some of the geographical considerations of the NEM (longest in the world), SA transmission network (long and skinny rather than an interconnected grid), and concentration of load (with only 3-5 “large” centers of demand (demand which is needed to stabilise any power network) in the state) affect supply, protection and reliability considerations.
Can the UFLS trigger points be set is such a way as to take the interconnectors into account and therefore be “more” ready to stabilise the grid when there is a failure at either end of the interconnect.
Three out of three generator failures in Pt Lincoln? Were they being paid to be on standby?
Were there any lessons to be learned from a very similar event in San Diago in 2011? If so were they applied to the NEM?
http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/Pages/September-2011-Southwest-Blackout-Event.aspx
“On May 1, 2012, FERC and NERC issued a joint report on the September 8, 2011 Southwest Blackout Event. On the afternoon of September 8, 2011, an 11-minute system disturbance occurred in the Pacific Southwest, leading to cascading outages and leaving approximately 2.7 million customers without power. The outages affected parts of Arizona, southern California, and Baja California, Mexico. All of the San Diego area lost power, with nearly 1.5 million customers losing power, some for up to 12 hours. The disturbance occurred near rush hour, on a business day, snarling traffic for hours. Schools and businesses closed, some flights and public transportation were disrupted, water and sewage pumping stations lost power, and beaches were closed due to sewage spills. Millions went without air conditioning on a hot day.”
Would Coal fired, or solar thermal available at PT Augusta have made any difference this time? Leaving aside transmission faults, would a solar or coal plant at Pt Augusta make any difference if wind is unavailable due to wind speed (over or under).
Given the geographic and density issues that make our system a little unique what is going to be the best way to stabilsie the grid – now, in 5 years – in 15 years? How should these different scenarios inform investment and remediation decisions that are going to made in light of the failure in September?
Was there an Australian or other standard at the time the transmission towers were built. What was it? Did the towers meet that standard? Is there a different standard in effect now? Should there be? If so how is the transmission network going to be upgraded and who pays for it? (and unless the towers were built after 1996 I’m not going to ask if there was Chinese steel used)
How many Politicians, Editors, and Commentators and going to have Pauline Hansonesque moment now and claim they were right all along as they flip their position from It’s all winds fault due to intermittency or high wind speed to it’s all winds fault because the setting were wrong?
Finally for those so inclined a slightly more technical reference.
http://www.smartpowergeneration.com/the-book-power-supply-challenges/chapter-2-balancing-the-electricity-supply-in-case-of-calamities
Phil aka the man in the hat. 19/10/16